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| A researcher performs genotyping analysis to identify plant genotypes at a laboratory. (PHOTO: XINHUA) |
Recently, the U.S. House Select Committee on China set up a so-called "whistleblower" reporting channel on its official website. It openly encourages American scholars, researchers, and other professionals to report scientific collaborations involving entities linked to China's defense and industrial base. Responding to the move, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular press briefing that the committee's efforts to suppress and contain China have reached an almost "hysterical" extent.
This assertion is hardly overstated. On social media, the committee justified its call for reports by citing concerns over "research security vulnerabilities" and the "risks" of cooperation with China. As evidence, it pointed to cases in which faculty members from the University of Washington and Texas A&M University co-authored academic papers with researchers from Chinese institutions listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce's entity list. The implication is unmistakable: the committee seeks to sever ties between U.S. researchers and some of China's most important research institutions already under U.S. sanctions. Even co-authoring academic papers, the most basic form of scholarly exchange, now appears to be enough to trigger suspicion and reporting.
Labeling such collaboration as "risks" or "vulnerable" is not only misguided but fundamentally at odds with established norms. U.S. export control regulations themselves include a well-defined "fundamental research exemption," under which research intended for open publication is not subject to such restrictions. By this standard, U.S. researchers are fully permitted to engage in fundamental research and publish jointly with institutions on the entity list. Treating these activities as suspect distorts both the spirit and the letter of existing rules.
History offers a sobering warning. Encouraging the reporting of China-related scientific collaboration risks opening a "Pandora's box" ultimately undermining the very foundations of the U.S. research system and its innovative capacity.
Between 2018 and 2022, the U.S. government's China Initiative conducted sweeping investigations into large numbers of researchers with China ties. The current reporting system mirrors this controversial program and is likely to worsen its negative impact. A study published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that the initiative contributed to a significant outflow of scientists of Chinese origin from the United States, with departures up by 75 percent between 2018 and 2021. Meanwhile, research by the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that investigations by the National Institutes of Health into U.S.-China collaboration reduced research output in affected fields, harming not only American science but also global scientific progress.
Equally concerning is the issue of due process. Even with formal investigations conducted by professional judicial bodies, the China Initiative produced a significant number of flawed or unsubstantiated cases. According to MIT Technology Review, by the end of 2021 only about one-quarter of defendants under the initiative by the U.S. Department of Justice were convicted. The committee's reliance on peer reporting — without clear safeguards for verification — raises the risk of aggravating errors, inviting false accusations, and placing innocent researchers under unwarranted scrutiny.
The specter of history looms large. Encouraging denunciations echoes the damage inflicted on the scientific community during McCarthyism in the 1950s. Baseless allegations of political disloyalty disrupted careers and stalled scientific progress, affecting prominent figures like Elvin A. Kabat and J. Robert Oppenheimer. While many accusations were later proven unfounded, the long-term damage to the U.S. research environment proved difficult to reverse.
Ultimately, promoting the reporting of China-related scientific collaboration risks self-inflicted harm. Rather than strengthening national security, it could erode trust, stifle openness, and weaken the very innovation ecosystem it seeks to protect.